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Literary Animals and the  
Problem of Anthropomorphism
1. Constructing Nonhuman Identities 
Identity is not something that should exclusively be granted to humans. 
Humanists however make an effort to use it this way by explicitly denying 
reason to nonhuman beings and thus identifying ‘human nature’ in oppo-
sition to the non-identity of animals. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno 
and Horkheimer write that “[t]he idea of man […] is expressed in the 
way in which he is distinguished from the animal. Animal irrationality 
is adduced as proof of human dignity.”1 This sums up the main problem 
of human versus animal identity and illustrates how fundamental this 
discussion is for the humanities. Denying nonhuman animals reason 
and subjectivity, and hence identity, is a move that is marked by human 
dominance and human narcissism. In order to avoid this gesture, critical 
scholars in a wide range of fields discuss this anthropocentric outlook on 
other beings and try to find other ways of approaching the problem. One 
has to be quite explicit when doing so because, as Cary Wolfe reminds 
us in his contribution to the debate regarding the study of nonhuman 
animals as part of the humanities, “to put it bluntly, just because we 
study nonhuman animals does not mean that we are not continuing to be 
humanist – and therefore, by definition, anthropocentric.”2 
The topic of this essay revolves around nonhuman identities in fiction. 
Identity is closely connected to individuality and personality. According 
1 Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and John Cumming, Dialectic of Enlighten-
ment (London: Verso, 2010), 245.
2 Cary Wolfe, “Human, All Too Human: ‘Animal Studies’ and the Humanities,” PMLA 
124 (2009): 568.
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to the Oxford English Dictionary, it derived from classical Latin identitas, 
from Latin idem, meaning ‘same’3 and marks someone as essentially and 
particularly her/himself that can be recognized and distinguished from 
others. In the following, I will argue that there are non-anthropocen-
tric ways of studying nonhuman animals, and that the key lies in taking 
animal identity seriously. Therefore I am very careful not to dismiss 
nonhuman characters as metaphorical or as subordinate to human char-
acters. The main questions I am trying to answer with this contribution 
are closely connected to one of the key problems that Human-Animal 
Studies scholars engaged in taking animals seriously are trying to solve, 
namely how to deal with anthropomorphism4: How is it possible to talk 
about nonhuman others without overly anthropomorphizing them and 
thus, possibly, denying them their unique otherness, their animality, their 
nonhuman animal identity? Should anthropomorphism, as a concept 
as well as a frame of mind, be fully rejected within literary studies of 
nonhuman others, or not?
These are valuable questions not only for literary scholars but also for 
philosophers because fiction has the power to go beyond a person’s own 
imagination and thus is able to influence and inspire one’s thoughts and 
actions. There is fiction that takes nonhuman animals seriously, and there 
are fables, fairy tales, children’s books, or other works of fiction that do 
not make a tremendous effort of lifting nonhuman animal characters 
onto the same level as human characters. Especially nowadays, with 
the animal turn5 hitting academia with full force, deconstructing other-
than-human identity from a non-anthropocentric or posthumanist point 
of view increasingly becomes the focus of attention within so-called 
Human-Animal Studies, or Critical Animal Studies.
In the following, I will draw on works by Jacques Derrida, Tom Tyler, 
Cary Wolfe, and others in order to find such a non-anthropocentric position 
from which to analyze fictional nonhuman characters. I am particularly 
concerned with what Tyler calls “first-and-foremost anthropocentrism” 
3 Oxford Dictionaries Online, s.v. “identity,” accessed May 5, 2014, http://www.oed.com.
4 Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human characteristics, emotions, or 
behavior to nonhuman animals.
5 The “animal turn” refers to an increasing scholarly interest in nonhuman animals. 
As “a new intellectual paradigm” that has evolved over the last two decades, it is 
“comparable in significance to the ‘linguistic turn’ that revolutionized humanities 
and social science disciplines from the mid-twentieth century onwards.” Laurence 
Simmons and Philip Armstrong, Knowing Animals (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 1. 
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or “epistemological anthropocentrism,” and which he questions on the 
grounds of its “presumed inevitability”: “Is one obliged to assert, as has 
so often been suggested, that humans are stopped up, as if within a bleak, 
restricting container, unable to access the wider world except through 
the translucent but necessarily distorting sides of their prison?”6 Fiction, 
I argue, can help to widen the perspective. This is where its power lies.
The novel that we will look at in order to get a glimpse of how 
fiction can challenge anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism is part 
of a corpus of contemporary dog novels7 that are critical to and aware 
of the constructed boundaries of ‘human/animal’, ‘nature/culture’, and 
‘domestication/wilderness’. To be able to show how close reading of such 
novels can deconstruct these boundaries it is essential to point to the 
underlying politics of literary representation. I am doing this with the 
help of a reading from a critical posthumanist perspective. I understand 
critical posthumanism as a frame of mind one adopts in order to overcome 
human narcissism. I specifically want to refer to Stefan Herbrechter’s 
formulation of the term:
The major conceptual challenge is the idea of a post- or 
non-anthropocentric worldview that a critical post huma-
nism implies. Seeing the world and ‘ourselves’ no longer 
as the central meaningful entity in the universe, and 
challenging our ingrained habit to anthropomorphize 
everything that comes into human view – these are the 
main targets of a ‘critical’ posthumanism, which looks for  
points of articulation outside a necessarily human-centred 
discourse like humanism.8
The critical posthumanist perspective allows us to analyze identities that 
are constructed in fiction through interspecies contact that triggers self-
reflection – thereby calling the human being into question, as well. From 
6 Tom Tyler, CIFERAE: A Bestiary in Five Fingers (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 2012), 3.
7 In my dissertation, from which the ideas for this essay derive, I analyze relationships 
between humans and dogs in contemporary Canadian, Australian, and US Amer-
ican fiction. The focus lies on interaction, alternatives to speech, hybridization, tech-
niques of de-domestication, and markers for co-domestication.
8 Stefan Herbrechter, “Posthumanism, Subjectivity, Autobiography,” Subjectivity 5.3 
(2012): 333.
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this position, it appears indispensable to ask whether anthropomorphism 
is a notorious ‘bad practice’ or an unavoidable mindset for talking and 
writing about nonhuman animals.
With the animal turn in the humanities and social sciences, anthro po-
centrism quickly acquired a negative connotation within the field of 
Human-Animal Studies. The challenge we are facing is this: How do we 
talk about nonhuman others in non-anthropocentric ways when all we 
have is the written word (undoubtedly coming from human hands)? What 
are epistemological and ontological questions underlying this dilemma 
and how do we, as scholars, deal with the gap between representation (of 
the nonhuman) and interpretation (from a human standpoint)?
2. Concepts of Language
I argue that we need to address these problems of talking about nonhuman 
animals in our discipline by integrating methods from other disciplines 
that can help to shift the focus away from the identity problem created 
by anthropocentrism, or by the preconditions of our ‘human nature’ per 
se. This also involves a redefinition of our terminology regarding clearly 
anthropocentric conceptions of human language, such as linguists define 
it. When we regard canine communication as a complex system of a 
different kind of language, we are one step closer to appreciating and 
recognizing in-between forms, and different degrees, of language in the 
novels.
In order to talk about nonhuman characters as individuals, one has 
to take into account the literal meaning of exactly this: talk. The ability 
to talk in a human way is naturally restricted to humans. This does 
not mean that there are no other concepts of language worthy of this 
label. That animal communication is a complex matter has been shown 
by many scholars in various fields, including anthropology, philosophy, 
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and ethology.9 Even though there is evidence that nonhuman animals 
possess language,10 the general conviction that they are less capable of 
communicating in complex ways remains strong and influential. There is 
a long tradition in philosophy whereby almost every major thinker (such 
as Aristotle, René Descartes, Martin Heidegger, Immanuel Kant, Jacques 
Lacan, and Emmanuel Levinas, to name a few) claims that animals do not 
possess language. This is of course directly linked to humanist conceptions 
of human superiority.
Jacques Derrida objects to this claim. He argues in favor of a more 
nuanced way of perceiving language that is posthumanist in the sense 
that it challenges traditional humanist explanations and understandings 
of language. 
The idea, according to which man is the only speaking 
being, in its traditional form or in its Heideggerian 
form, seems to me at once undisplaceable and highly 
problematic. Of course, if one defines language in such a 
way that it is reserved for what we call man, what is there 
to say? But if one re-inscribes language in a network of 
9 For a critical discussion of language as a distinguishing marker between species 
and the problematic assumptions that arise from the absence of verbal language 
in animals, see for example (to name just a couple of sources) Barbara Noske’s 
chapter “Human-Animal Discontinuities?” in Beyond Boundaries (New York: Black 
Rose Books, 1997, 126–160), where she also provides various examples for animal 
language in different species, or Cary Wolfe’s chapter “In the Shadow of Wittgen-
stein’s Lion: Language, Ethics, and the Question of the Animal,” in Zoontologies 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, 1–57).
10 For instance, the research of linguist Con Slobodchikoff “shows that prairie dog 
colonies have a communication system that includes nouns, verbs, and adjectives. 
They can tell one another what kind of predator is approaching […] and they can 
tell each other how fast it is moving. They can say whether a human is carrying a 
gun or not. They can also identify individual coyotes and tell one another which 
one is coming. […] Slobodchikoff also found evidence that prairie dogs are not born 
knowing the calls, the way a baby is born knowing how to cry. They have to learn 
them. He bases this on the fact that the different prairie dog colonies around Flag-
staff, Arizona, all have different dialects”; their communication is creative, produc-
tive, complex, and “allows for displacement” (Margo deMello, Animals and Society: 
An Introduction to Human-Animal Studies [New York: Columbia University Press, 
2012], 366). DeMello lists a couple of such proofs for animal language in her book 
chapter “Animal Behavior Studies and Ethology” (349–373), among them the famous 
case of Rico the dog, who manages “fast mapping, the ability to learn new words” 
(367), as well as case studies including parrots, dolphins and apes.
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possibilities that do not merely encompass it but mark 
it irreducibly from the inside, everything changes. I am 
thinking in particular of the mark in general, of the trace, 
of iterability, of differance [sic]. These possibilities or 
necessities, without which there would be no language, 
are themselves not only human. [...] And what I am 
proposing here should allow us to take into account 
scientific knowledge about the complexity of “animal 
languages,” genetic coding, all forms of marking within 
which so-called human language, as original as it might 
be, does not allow us to “cut” once and for all where we 
would in general like to cut.11 
In this passage from an interview, Derrida points to the anthropocentric 
bias and displays his advocacy of a more differentiated, open concept 
of language that takes into account non-verbal animal languages. If we 
translate this to the realm of the novel, re-inscription of language takes 
place in the imagination and opens up new possibilities and forms of 
understanding between human and nonhuman animals.
What remains as a crucial point for studying dog novels is that 
canines simply cannot respond in human spoken language. Hence, 
representing them as talking animals within the novels is not appropriate 
if one wants to take them seriously, as it overly anthropomorphizes 
them. Instead, I find it more enlightening to study such works of fiction 
where communication takes place in a realistic way, for example as sign 
language,12 as emotional engagement, as forms of companionship with 
assumed mutual understanding, or simply through interspecies inter-
action where boundaries and needs are tested as the human-dog couples 
go along.
Overall, accuracy in the description of animals’ experiences, such as 
in sequences where the omniscient narrator informs the reader about the 
canine’s thoughts and feelings, does not need to be our dominant concern 
when it comes to defining language because this task is simply impossible. 
To underline this point, I like to mention Mojave Dan, a man described by 
11 Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Weber, Points: Interviews, 1974–1994 (Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 1995), 284–285 (emphasis original).
12 The boy Edgar Sawtelle and the Sawtelle dogs communicate via sign language in 
David Wroblewski’s novel The Story of Edgar Sawtelle (2008).
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J. Allen Boone in Kinship with All Life who refers to the impossibility of 
accuracy as follows: “There’s facts about dogs, and there’s opinions about 
them. The dogs have the facts, and the humans have the opinions. If you 
want facts about a dog, always get them straight from the dog.”13 For 
the underlying concepts of language this means that the context, which 
in its literal meaning is text, needs to be taken into account. Fiction can 
only accurately represent human language because it is written by and 
expressed through our restricted experiences and outlooks on life. 
3. Different Takes on Anthropomorphism
Despite these constraints, the fictional world is a world of opportunity. 
Especially intimate and everyday relations to domesticated animals can 
be narrated in a way that triggers rethinking of actual nonhuman animals’ 
existence and provides us with examples of how they might experience 
and see the world we share. Even if it is through human language and the 
written word, the process of rethinking functions on both sides: the reader 
and the writer can both empathize with the nonhuman protagonists. In 
A Thousand Plateaus Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari illustrate how 
‘becoming-animal’ works and what impact it can have on the writer. 
If the writer is a sorcerer, it is because writing is a 
becoming, writing is traversed by strange becomings that 
are not becomings-writer, but becomings-rat, becomings- 
insect, becomings-wolf, etc. […] Writers are sorcerers 
because they experience the animals as the only population 
before which they are responsible in principle. […] Who 
has not known the violence of these animal sequences, 
which uproot one from humanity, if only for an instant, 
making one scrape at one’s bread like a rodent or giving 
one the yellow eyes of a feline?14
Deleuze and Guattari describe how writing can be a process of trans-
formation where one is able to deeply identify with the animal other. This 
13 J. Allen Boone, Kinship with All Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 47–48.
14 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia (London: Continuum, 2008), 265.
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is possible because that animal other has real representatives in the actual 
world. It is both a physical and a psychological experience which shows 
that literature has powers that we might yet have to release. This gives 
us an impulse to look for manifestations of affect and empathy regarding 
nonhuman life in the fictional texts. For example, a task can be to search 
the stories for displays of empathy, and for speciesist or antispeciesist 
views of nonhuman animals and their representations.
The move from speciesism to anthropomorphism in a critical 
posthumanist reading is not farfetched. The majority of animal rights 
inspired critics see anthropomorphism as reinforcing species boundaries 
and proposing a speciesist/anthropocentrist worldview. The matter 
is however quite complex, as we will see by taking a look at different 
opinions about anthropomorphism. As an antispeciesist, I tend to argue 
in favor of novels that reduce its use to a minimum. Furthermore, I 
believe that the more closely the fictional texts approach the ‘human/
animal’ boundary and the more they engage with the nonhuman animal 
experience, the more the reader is challenged in the reading process and 
thus inspired to rethink humanist concepts of life. John Simons, as he 
writes in Animal Rights and the Politics of Literary Representation, holds 
a similar view. 
It is clear that the more closely identified with the 
non-human the fictive world becomes, then the more 
its representational strategies will tend towards the 
blurring [...] of the boundary between the human and 
the non-human. Indeed, it might be said that in texts 
where this boundary is allowed to become porous there 
is a striving towards the impossible task of actually 
reproducing what it is to be an animal.15
When questioned about his approach towards literature that anthropo-
morphizes nonhuman animals, Simons goes so far as to suggest that 
anthropomorphism does not necessarily lead to reinforced boundaries 
between human and other animals. He believes that anthropomorphizing 
nonhuman animals can even foster animal rights.
15 John Simons, Animal Rights and the Politics of Literary Representation (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 140.
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I take the view that anything that stimulates people to 
think more carefully and, therefore one hopes, more 
kindly about animals is a good thing and therefore I am 
very comfortable with anthropomorphism as a useful 
representational strategy. […] I tend to be very pragmatic 
though and think that the animal rights movement should 
take whatever is on offer that is helpful.16
Does anthropomorphism as a pragmatic strategy really help the non human 
animals to be accepted and respected for what they are? As Tom Tyler 
reminds us in his essay “If Horses had Hands,” there are more supporters 
(who are mostly coming from at least an animal welfarist position) of 
the idea that anthropomorphism is a helpful strategy. He looks at the 
psychologist Gordon Burghardt, who sees the potential in “critical 
anthropomorphism” as an “investigative tool,”17 as well as at various 
other thinkers, including for example John S. Kennedy, the author of The 
New Anthropomorphism, who argues that heuristic anthropomorphism 
should be understood as only valuable metaphorically.
Variations on this pragmatic approach are recommended 
by the primatologist Frans de Waal […] and the philosopher 
Daniel Dennett […]. Even Kennedy and [Stephen] 
Budiansky, who call it “mock anthropomorphism” […] 
consider it a useful “metaphorical” mode of thinking about 
the development of particular species, or of the processes 
of evolution. All these writers issue stern warnings about 
the dangers of conflating anthropomorphic language 
with anthropomorphic thinking, however.18
I want to add that Frans de Waal argues “even though heuristic anthropo-
morphism may occasionally be anthropocentric, most of the time it will 
be animalcentric.”19 By animalcentric anthropomorphism he means 
16 John Simons and Rod Bennison, “Animal Rights and the Politics of Literary Repre-
sentation: Interview,” ANTENNAE 5.19 (2011): 17. 
17 Tom Tyler, “If Horses Had Hands…,” in Animal Encounters, ed. Manuela Rossini and 
Tom Tyler (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 19.
18 Ibid., 19.
19 Frans B. M. de Waal, “Anthropomorphism and Anthropodenial: Consistency in Our 
Thinking about Humans and Other Animals,” Philosophical Topics 27.1 (1999): 170.
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a method that is used to understand nonhuman animals on their own 
terms. In the context of literary studies, however, this does not seem to 
lead us anywhere near the nonhuman animal that is hiding (or hidden) 
between the lines, because the animal is there only in words and our 
interpretation. Animalcentrism according to de Waal’s understanding 
cannot successfully be transferred to literary studies of animals because 
the fictional context does not fulfill the necessary conditions for such an 
adaptation.
Depending on the context, anthropomorphism appears to be either 
something to support or to challenge. How can this uneasiness with 
anthropomorphism, which I strongly experience myself, be explained? 
Tyler points to an important underlying problem in this regard, for which 
he refers to Heidegger.
Both the objections to anthropomorphism (that it 
denigrates human and animal) and the responses they 
have elicited (that it is inevitable and informative) are 
superseded, or rather preceded, by a more fundamental 
question. This concern, which renders problematic the 
very notion of anthropomorphism, has been articulated 
most clearly by Heidegger […] [who] points out that, in 
order even to raise ‘suspicions’ (Bedenken) concerning 
anthropomorphism, one must assume that one knows 
‘ahead of time’ what human beings are.20
There we go: before we can even begin to discuss ‘animal nature,’ Heidegger 
and Tyler claim, the question ‘What is a human being?’ needs to be asked. 
This leads us back to the beginning and confirms my initial statement: 
nonhuman animal identity in fiction always raises epistemological and 
ontological questions. Studying literary animals, then, implies questioning 
the essence or identity of ‘human nature.’ Therefore, approaching 
literary animals with a critical posthumanist reading is essential if one 
wants to avoid the “‘first and foremost’ anthropocentrism, [the] species 
narcissism”21 that Tyler so vehemently criticizes.
20 Tyler, “If Horses Had Hands…,” 20.
21 Ibid., 23.
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4. Approaching Fictional Dogs
Let us now take a look at a fictional work that challenges the human/
animal boundary and anthropomorphist depictions of dogs. Helen 
Humphrey’s Wild Dogs is a Canadian novel that tells the stories of 
six human beings and how they lose their canine companions to the 
‘wilderness’. One characteristic of Wild Dogs is the attempt to avoid 
anthropomorphic description. This manifests itself in a peculiar way, 
namely by removing the canines from the setting. For a long time, they 
are absent from the present narrative thread. Therefore, the dogs appear 
to slip away on several levels: on the level of direct interaction with the 
human characters, on the level of the narration as manifested in the 
points of view and character focalizations, and on the meta-level of the 
text that discusses the absence of nonhuman animals from human lives. 
Only towards the end of the story do they appear in the present narration, 
when one of the human protagonists, Lily, enters the woods to join the 
pack of wild dogs. The following passage describes Lily’s experience in 
the woods where she successfully joins the pack.
The dogs take me with them. They know where they’re 
going and I follow them. Some of them still wear collars 
around their necks, and if I stumble on the ground, I can 
reach out and hold on to one of the collars. [...] I can’t 
remember their names, but they don’t need their names 
here. I can’t make them do anything here using their 
names. Even Dog, who knows me, doesn’t need to be 
mine like she had to be when she lived in the apartment 
and slept on the end of my bed. She is not mine here. I am 
hers. Lily is a dog. Lily is a dog. Lily is a dog.22
Lily’s decision to stay with the pack and adapt to their habits, as well 
as Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘becoming-animal’ quoted above, 
are both instances of impossibilities23 of reproducing what it is to be 
an animal. These instances are situated in the context of the pack that 
brings humans and animals to eye level through the interaction within 
what can be called a network. Lily, the only human member of the pack, 
22 Helen Humphreys, Wild Dogs (London: Maya, 2005), 145.
23 See John Simons, quoted above.
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shares with the canines what is neither uniquely human nor uniquely 
animal: vulnerability, the longing to live and survive, and a need for 
companionship. By stressing these elements within the narration, Wild 
Dogs manages to shift the focus away from hierarchies regarding species-
belonging, as well as from spoken language as a marker for domination 
and human-centric representation.
Before Lily sets out to approach the pack, the loss of the dogs renders 
the other protagonists immobile. They feel not only left behind, but also 
insecure about their own identity, as is illustrated in the following quote, 
which provides us with the perspective of Alice, another former dog 
owner.
It is the strangest feeling to see my dog running towards 
me with no glimmer of recognition in her eyes. How 
can I still know her and she not know me at all? [...] 
Sometimes the dogs are so close that we can smell 
them. […] But they don’t return to us. We come out to 
the woods every evening and call to the dogs, and they 
never come back. And it is not about love, although we 
love the dogs fiercely. But the dogs didn’t understand our 
love when they lived with us and certainly they don’t 
understand it now. Whatever they felt for us then wasn’t 
what we know of love. No, it is not about love. It is about 
belonging. Once we belonged with those dogs, belonged 
to them, and now that they’ve left us we don’t know who 
we are.24
Such passages where the protagonists experience a sense of loss of 
identity and belonging are numerous in this novel. Alice’s rejection of an 
appreciation of human love by the canines can be read against the grain 
as revealing a posthumanist state of mind that shies away from jumping 
to conclusions or forcing phenomena into anthropocentric categories. 
I argue that Humphreys establishes this emotional boundary because 
she avoids anthropomorphist descriptions, which claim knowledge 
about nonhuman beings that cannot be known. Wild Dogs should not 
be misread as anthropocentric in the sense that it limits the capacity of 
having emotional relationships to human beings. Precisely due to the 
24 Humphreys, Wild Dogs, 12.
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fact that the novel tells stories of companion species entanglement, it 
chooses a way around the trap of applying anthropomorphism. This 
is achieved, for example, by avoiding the explicit attribution of human 
emotions to dogs. Other protagonists also avoid claiming knowledge 
of what goes on inside the dogs’ minds. That complex canine emotions 
remain hypothetical throughout the novel can be regarded as a positive 
or affirmative perspective. This should not be confused with the 
aforementioned “heuristic anthropomorphism” (Frans de Waal) used to 
predict behavior in animals, to which it stands in contrast.
That being said, here we are at a delicate moment where the problem 
of point of view merges with the problem of how to analyze this point of 
view. It is necessary here to question the type of the nonhuman response: 
What if we regard the canine as mirroring the reader, as simply returning 
their gaze? Do we project onto the dog our desires, our questions to the 
story and to the human protagonists? I believe we tend to do so, and that 
this can be a trap if we want to maintain a critical perspective. Regarding 
the canine as a hybrid being that is entangled in a network of human-
animal relations can help us recognize and take seriously this new 
perspective. Whenever a canine voice is given in the text, be it through an 
omniscient narrator, free indirect speech, or dream sequences, we have 
a response. This allows for the dog to embody his or her own viewpoint 
in the narrative and be more than a mirror. In Wild Dogs, the strategy 
is a different one that relies on the unapproachability and otherness of 
the canines. This strategy communicates, not their voices, but rather 
their behavior and the descriptions of their shared lives with the human 
protagonists. As a result, they do not run the risk of becoming a mirror.
5. Conclusion
To complicate matters one last time, one might argue that canine voices 
that are given in novels are yet other human voices in disguise. Admittedly, 
the author cannot fully abandon their human predisposition, but one 
should not deny a gifted writer the ability to portray a completely other 
and unique character, as Deleuze’s and Guattari’s concept of becoming 
in writing suggests. Often, it is this struggle with language to depict 
the canine in an animalistic and yet poetic way that produces the most 
interesting and rich passages within a novel. In this struggle for clarity 
52 — Anne Franciska Pusch
of boundaries on the one hand and the canine as traveler between worlds 
and dichotomies on the other, we have brought up the difficult subject 
that it might still be impossible to write (poetically or critically) about 
animals without falling into the trap of anthropomorphism at one point 
or another. Consequently, we are left with the option to try our best by 
pointing at the in-between spaces of human-animal encounters because 
they often bear the most meaning and trigger the best discussion. Even if 
we cannot make things absolutely clear, we can ask crucial questions on 
our way towards a possible understanding of interspecies entanglements 
and find a way of dropping the mask of anthropomorphism.
As with every bottomless gaze, as with the eyes of the 
other, the gaze called “animal” offers to my sight the 
abyssal limit of the human: the inhuman or the ahuman, 
the ends of man, that is to say, the bordercrossing from 
which vantage man dares to announce himself to himself, 
thereby calling himself by the name that he believes he 
gives himself.25
Here, Derrida reminds us that fictional texts that feature interspecies 
encounters do not only point to nonhuman animals’ experiences. 
They always also question human existence, human mortality, and the 
intertwining of human and animal lives. Cary Wolfe also draws on 
Derrida when he points out how a non-anthropocentric approach can 
uncover the fundamental similarities of human and nonhuman life.
Instead of recognizing the moral standing of animals 
because of the agency or capabilities they share with us 
[...], Derrida fundamentally questions the structure of the 
‘auto-’ (as autonomy, as agency, as authority over one’s 
autobiography) of humanist subjectivity by riveting 
our attention on the embodied finitude that we share 
with nonhuman animals, a finitude that it has been the 
business of humanism largely to disavow.26
25 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, trans. Marie-Louise Mallet (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 12.
26 Wolfe, “Human, All Too Human,” 570.
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This is again also the finitude that we find in novels such as Wild Dogs. 
When we analyze these fictional encounters from the point of view of 
humans who nevertheless see their existence as part of a network of 
different individuals that modify each other, we see that human identities 
become affected by or infected with nonhuman others that partake in 
this life. I argue that the mixture of approaches – critical posthumanism, 
close reading, and an overall non-anthropocentric outlook on 
nonhuman animals, including a redefinition of terminology such as 
language, communication, and codomestication – can be a way towards 
minimization of anthropomorphism in practicing literary criticism in the 
field of Human-Animal Studies.
It has been the mistake of many decriers of anthropo-
centrism to set about attacking it before they have really 
understood what it is. The primary task, therefore, is to 
lay bare the forms, sites and contradictions of anthro po-
centrism. Only once equipped with the aware ness of its 
omnipresence, even and perhaps most disconcertingly in 
its denials, can the possibilities for an alternative even 
begin to be sketched. If [...] we must lay bare the ways 
in which anthropocentrism holds us captive, we may, in 
becoming aware of the captivity, see the impossibility 
of transcending it. We may observe, with Derrida, how 
the ‘centre’ makes discourse cohere, but at the same time 
remains analytically elusive.27
Closing this essay with Rob Boddice’s remarks, I want to highlight that 
this can only be one approach among many. When, as critical literary 
scholars, we want to deconstruct nonhuman animal identities as they are 
constructed (and have been pre-constructed) in fictional texts, the literary 
encounter is the movement away from our anthropocentrist comfort zone 
and towards the (sometimes uncomfortable) process of self-questioning 
involved in close reading or other forms of engagement with the text. 
For every novel that is studied, underlying values, varying degrees or 
levels of anthropomorphism, possible purposes of anthropomorphist 
depictions, and, as a result, different interpretations have to be taken 
27 Rob Boddice, “Introduction,” in Anthropocentrism: Humans, Animals, Environ-
ments, ed. Rob Boddice (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 5.
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into account. Each study also needs to look at how nonhuman animal 
language is defined in the particular text, how the nonhuman identities 
are constructed, and which questions can be posed to the novel.
When we approach the nonhuman without the glasses of 
anthropomorphism, we already prevent ourselves from falling into the 
trap of human narcissism and may eventually be able to free ourselves 
from the cages of anthropocentrism. Questions arise, are posed, and 
might not be answered. Fiction then can answer some questions for us 
if we allow our imagination and empathy to cross boundaries. Above 
all, the critical posthumanist perspective most strongly points to these 
boundaries, lays bare these gaps, and draws the critics’ attention to the 
power structures inherent in assumed and constructed knowledge.
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